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VIRGINIA SECTION 
ARTICLE 
RADAR IN THE COURTS 
By D. W. WooDBRIDGE* 
According to an Associated Press survey, the results of which were re-
leased on July 26, 1954, twenty-nine states were then using radar for 
traffic control either locally or on a state-wide basis. However, only a 
few of these states have statutes on the matter, and since the use of radar 
for traffic control is relatively new, there are only a small number of cases 
on the subject. All the regularly reported cases to date have arisen in 
states having no special legislation on the use of radar devices, and none 
of these cases is from a court of highest resort. The recently passed Vir-
ginia statute governing the use of radar for traffic control became effective 
July 1, 1954. Perhaps by setting forth that statute in detail we may dis-
cuss more easily the use of radar in the courts. 
§ 46-215.2. Checks on speed by use of electrical device; 
prima facie evidence of speed; arrest without warrant where 
signs show legal rate of speed.-(a) The speed of any motor 
vehicle may be checked by the use of radiomicro waves or other 
electrical device. The results of such checks shall be accepted as 
prima facie evidence of the speed of such motor vehicle in any court 
or legal proceedings where the speed of the motor vehicle is at issue. 
(b) The driver of any such motor vehicle may be arrested without 
a warrant under this section provided the arresting officer is in uni-
form or displays his badge of authority; provided that such officer 
has observed the recording of the speed of such motor vehicle by the 
radiomicro waves or other electrical device, or has received a radio 
message from the officer who observed the speed of the motor 
vehicle recorded by the radiomicro waves or other electrical device; 
provided in case of an arrest based on such a message that such 
radio message has been dispatched immediately after the speed of the 
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motor vehicle was recorded and furnished the license number of the 
vehicle and the recorded speed to the arresting officer.1 
(c) No operator of a motor vehicle may be arrested under this 
section unless signs have been placed at the State line on the primary 
highway system, and outside cities and towns having over 3500 
population, on the primary highways to indicate the legal rate of 
speed and that the speed of motor vehicles may be measured by 
radiomicro waves or other electrical devices. 
(d) Nothing herein shall affect the powers of cities or towns to 
adopt and use such devices to measure speed.2 
This statute appears to be well drawn and should leave little room for 
argument about its meaning.a 
ENTRAPMENT 
Neither animal nor motorist likes to be trapped. Indeed, entrapment 
under certain circumstances is regarded as a defense to criminal prosecu-
tion. Also, the practice of trapping motorists may damage police rela-
tions with the public, making it difficult for those caught to believe that 
the police are their servants and friends, rather than fiends out to get them 
by fair means or foul in order to fill an arbitrarily required quota of ar-
rests. Such an attitude may in tum develop bitterness and antisocial feel-
ings, especially in the young. To prevent this unhappy result, some states 
by statute have eliminated the possible use of speed traps.4 
The constitutionality of one such statute has been upheld on the ground 
I. Section (b) is obviously desirable since in the absence of statute an officer has no 
right to arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence unless he has a warrant. 
In the case of two-man teams the misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the 
one who takes the reading and not in the presence of the one who effects the arrest. 
2. VA. CoDE § 46-215.2 (Supp. 1954). 
3. The Maryland statute is much shorter: 
In any legal proceeding of any nature the speed of a motor vehicle may be 
proved by evidence of a test made upon such vehicle with any device designed 
to measure and indicate or record the speed of a moving object by means of 
radio-micro waves. Such evidence shall not be introduced in any proceedings 
to enforce motor vehicle speed limits unless the highway or road on which such 
device was used was clearly marked within four miles of said device. MD. ANN. 
CoDE GEN. LAws art. 35, § 99 (Supp. 1954). 
4. The California statute on speed traps reads in part: 
(a) No peace officer or other person shall use a speed trap in arresting, or 
participating or assisting in the arrest of, any person for any alleged violation of 
Division IX of this code [i.e., Vehicle Code] nor shall any speed trap be used in 
securing evidence as to the speed of any vehicle for the purpose of an arrest or 
prosecution under this code. CAL. VEmCLE CoDE § 751 (1948). See also CAL. 
VEIDCLE CoDE § 752 (Supp. 1953). See a similar provision in ORE. REv. STAT. 
§ 483.112 (1953). 
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that the legislature may well have thought that actively patrolling the 
roads was the best method of preventing illegal speeding, and that pre-
vention of crime is far better than apprehension after a preventable crime 
has taken place.v It has been seriously contended that these statutes pre-
clude the use of radar. So far as the writer has been able to ascertain, 
radar devices are not now being used in California, which has a statute 
on speed traps; hence there is no judicial ruling on the matter in that 
state. 
However, traps do serve useful purposes. Our problem is to determine 
how to secure the advantages of traps without their disadvantages. The 
writer does not subscribe to the theory that the police must always say in 
effect, "We are about to check your speed" before they have a right to 
make the check. It should be sufficient that everyone has a fair warning 
that a particular device is, or may be, in use and that violation of the law 
is at one's peril. Whether a driver speeds or not is largely a matter of 
psychology in which such elements as reason, consideration for others, and 
likelihood of apprehension are all important factors. 
A good friend of the writer who handles many criminal cases stated 
flatly that he did not like radar. The reason seemed to be that it stacked 
the cards against an offender and made an acquittal a very difficult matter, 
indeed. But these reasons are merely the reasons of the old woman and the 
fox hunter-the old woman's reason that it imposes hardship on a person 
not to give him some avenue of escape, the fox hunter's reason that it is 
not a sporting proposition. But law is not, nor should it purport to be, a 
game, and a game of chance at that. The object of the criminal law is the 
elimination, or at least the reduction to an irreducible minimum, of crime. 
A high probability of apprehension is an enormous factor in securing that 
objective, especially among those of our fellow citizens who for the time 
being do not understand any other language. 
JumciAL NoTICE AND RELATED ToPICS 
A very practical consideration is whether the courts will take judicial 
notice of the accuracy of radar speed meters, or whether, as a condition 
to the admission of such evidence, expert testimony must first be had as 
to the modus operandi and the reliability of the results. 
The first reported case seems to be People v. Offermann.6 The defendant 
was charged with proceeding at a rate of 41 miles an hour in a 30 mile-
an-hour zone in the City of Buffalo. The only evidence against her was 
the testimony of three policemen as to the radar speed meter reading. 
5. Fleming v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 344, 238 Pac. 88 (1925). 
6. 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
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A police officer who was not an engineer or a physicist, but who had had 
many years of practical experience in police radio work, testified over ob-
jection as to the accuracy of the device. Both sides moved for an ad-
journment so that an expert could be produced, but the motions were 
overruled. In anticipation of cases of this sort coming up, the trial judge 
had been shown how the radar equipment worked. He had driven his 
own car and had been clocked by the radar device at 54 miles an hour, 
which was the exact speed he was traveling as shown by his speedometer. 
The defendant was convicted. She appealed. 
The appellate court held that at least two errors were committed in the 
above-described procedure. First, it was an abuse of discretion to allow a 
man unacquainted with the theory of radar (even though he had had 
practical experience) to testify as an expert, and in this connection it was 
error to refuse to grant an adjournment to enable the parties to call in a 
real expert. It was also an error for a trial judge to base his decision in 
whole or in part on what the court called "an unauthorized view."7 The 
court also stated: 
. . . it [the science of electronics] must not bring push button justice 
unless and except such justice is surrounded by the long-established 
rules of evidence. 
The legislature in its wisdom might see :fit to declare that the read-
ing of an electrical timing device similar to the one here may be 
admitted in evidence as prima facie evidence of the speed of the 
automobile of an accused, after such device has been certified as 
accurate by the authority designated by the legislature. By such 
legislation, the People will be relieved of the burden of proving the 
accuracy of the electrical timing device upon each trial and by ex-
pert testimony. The traveling public will be protected against 
convictions based upon the reading of an unproven and possibly in-
accurate device, and of equal importance, the rules of evidence will 
not be violated. 8 
It will be noted that the Virginia statute expressly provides that the re-
sults of such checks shall be accepted as prima facie evidence of the speed 
of such motor vehicle in any court or legal proceedings.9 But it is also 
stated that "[n] othing herein shall affect the powers of cities or towns to 
adopt and use such devices to measure speed."10 It should be noted that 
cities and towns may use radar to check speed provided, of course, they 
7. Id., 125 N.Y.S.2d at 184. 
8. ld., 125 N.Y.S.2d at 185. 
9. VA. CooE § 46-215.2(a) (Supp. 1954). 
10. ld. at (d). 
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comply with federal laws. But if they do, and if this section of the code 
is held not to apply to cities and towns of more than 3500 populatioll, then 
the same common-law principles of evidence would seem to be applicable 
as in states where radar is now being used without statutory authority. 
So far, all courts of appellate rank have refused to take judicial notice 
of the accuracy of radar speed readings in the absence of a statute so re-
quiring. In two New York cases11 Dr. John M. Kopper, an electrical en-
gineering teacher and research worker in the :field of electrical installation 
and automatic control at the Johns Hopkins University, qualified as an 
expert. He testified in detail regarding the construction of the radar 
speed meter "and by means of diagrams, charts and formulas explained 
its operation and the principle involved in determining the speed of 
moving vehicles. He also testified that the operator of the recording 
equipment can tell when it is 'out of calibration' and may 'quite easily' 
determine when the machine is not working properly."12 And in a New 
Jersey case13 this same expert testified on cross-examination that "if any 
defects in the radar equipment were to develop, such as defective tubes or 
condensers, or low voltage in the battery, it would all tend to decrease 
the number of electrons emitted from the heat surfaces within the tubes 
and give a lower and less than true reading. All defects in the equipment 
resolve in favor of the motorist."14 
In one case15 the court stated that evidence gained by radar would not 
be admitted unless an expert witness also testified: 
No expert testimony was offered on the part of the People to estab-
lish the fact that the so-called radar equipment is a mechanism that 
correctly and accurately records the speed of passing automobiles. 
The use of radar is comparatively new as a means of bringing about 
the arrest of violators of ordinances pertaining to the speed of auto-
mobiles and until such time as the courts recognize radar equipment 
as a method of accurately measuring the speed of automobiles in 
those cases in which the People rely solely upon the speed indicator 
of the radar equipment, it will be necessary to establish by expert 
testimony the accuracy of radar for the purpose of measuring 
speed.16 
11. People v. Katz, 129 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Yonkers Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954); People v. Sarver, 
129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (New Rochelle Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954). 
12. People v. Katz, 129 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Yonkers Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954). 
13. State v. Dantonio, 105 A.2d 918 (County Ct. N.J. 1954). 
14. !d. at 921. 
15. People v. Torpey, 128 N.Y.S.2d 864 (County Ct. N.Y. 1953). 
16. !d. at 866. This view is supported in a case comment in 5 MERCER L. REv. 
322, 323 (1954) on the ground that "the modem mind has a tendeucy to pay 
homage to the advancements of science by accepting without question hypothesis 
[sic] coming even from the very frontiers of research." 
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It is submitted that such a view creates an unjustifiable lag between natural 
laws discovered and utilized by science and the recognition of these laws 
by the courts. There is no disagreement among the experts. The 
average man is as capable of understanding radar as he is radio, telephone, 
television, or blood types. It is not like the lie detector, or even the 
drunkometer, where variable human elements must be considered. The 
use of ordinary speedometers has long been acceptedP 
Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, already approved by the Ameri-
can Bar Association at its 1953 meeting, judicial notice "shall be taken 
without request by a party . . . of such specific facts and propositions of 
generalized knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot rea-
sonably be the subject of dispute."18 Radar speed meters are now in this 
category. Why should the time of experts be wasted and the expenses of 
litigation be increased by compelling such men to appear in court after 
court telling the same truths over and over? While it is agreed that 
every reasonable doubt about the accuracy of new developments should 
promptly be resolved against them in the absence of expert evidence, 
there is no longer any such doubt concerning radar. Rather, the ap-
plicable maxim should now be, "What the world generally !mows a court 
of justice may be assumed to know."19 
Courts have agreed that the mere fact that the radar equipment was 
operated by a person or persons not skilled in electronics is not of suf-
ficient import to render the radar speed meter readings inadmissible in 
evidence since such operation is of a ministerial nature.20 Nor, of course, 
is it material whether or not judge or jury agree with the policy of hidden 
radar equipment to detect the speed of vehicles upon the highways.21 
In only one case, as far as the writer could ascertain, has the defendant 
attempted to prove the inaccuracy of the radar speed meter.22 In this 
case the defendant bus driver's vehicle was equipped with a tachograph, 
17. Spokane v. Knight, 96 Wash. 403, 165 Pac. 105 (1917). 
18. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 9 (1954). 
19. People v. Beck, 130 N.Y.S.2d 354, 356 (Sup. Ct. 1954), quoting from People v. 
Gitlow, 234 N.Y. 132, 143, 136 N.E. 317, 321 (1922). Yet the court in this case 
refused to admit that the accuracy of radar was at present generally known and 
reversed a conviction based partly on radar speed meter results and partly on eye-
witness testimony as to speed, stating that the latter was admissible but the former 
was not unless supported by expert testimony. Since it did not appear that the 
verdict was based solely on the admissible evidence the case was reversed and 
remanded. 
20. State v. Moffitt, 100 A.2d 778 (Super. Ct. Del. 1953); State v. Dantonio, 105 
A.2d 918 (County Ct. N.J. 1954). 
21. See State v. Moffitt, 100 A.2d 778, 780 (Super. Ct. Del. 1953). 
22. State v. Dantonio, 105 A.2d 918 (County Ct. N.J. 1954). 
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an instrument which records speeds as shown by the speedometer on a 
revolving cylinder. The court heard both tachograph and radar experts, 
and in this battle royal the radar won in spite of a five miles-per-hour 
difference.-
THE HEARSAY PROBLEM 
The radar equipment is customarily checked before it is used. Usually 
one officer runs a police car through the radar beam and by radio reports 
his speedometer reading to another officer, who is operating the radar 
equipment. If the readings of the car speedometer and the radar device are 
the same, the radar equipment is accurate and may be used. This same 
check is made after the device is used. If the two recordings are again 
the same there is good reason to believe that the intermediate readings are 
correct. 
In one case23-the only one in which the point was discussed-the court 
held testimony of these checks to be inadmissible hearsay, for each officer 
had no firsthand knowledge of what the other officer told him. He knew 
only what he had heard. If the testimony of the officers as to the accuracy 
of the radar speed meter is required as part of the plaintiff's case, and the 
holding above is correct, a grave problem of proof is raised. But is it 
correct? 
The holding seems to be overly technical and overlooks the fact that 
the officer is testifying to the fact of utterance of one meter reading and 
the actual reading of the other meter. Thus, the hearsay rule does not 
apply. Each officer has firsthand knowledge that his mechanism showed -
the same speed as was called by the other. The testing was a joint under-
taking, and all the parties thereto can be present in court, put under oath, 
and thoroughly cross-examined. There is no reason to falsify, and the 
statements as to coincidence of reading are made in the usual course of 
duty. It has been held in a number of cases that one person could testify 
as to the fact that another had called out a certain automobile license 
number and that he had written that number down and, according to his 
writing, the number was such and such.24 It would seem on the same 
principle that in testing the radar equipment the fact of coincidence of 
speedometer and radar device readings could be testified to by those hav-
ing firsthand knowledge thereof, the fact of intercommunication being 
collateral to the fact of knowledge of coincidence.2:; 
23. People v. Offermann, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
24. Chalmers v. Anthony, 8 N.J. Misc. 775, 151 Atl. 549 (Sup. Ct. 1930). 
25. See 7 VAND. L. REv. 411 (1954). 
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THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
In Virginia what must the prosecution show in order to make out a 
prima facie case? In order to avoid probable argument the prosecution 
should offer proof: 
( 1) That the officer effecting the arrest was in uniform or displayed his 
badge of authority. 
(2) That the signs required by statute had been properly placed. 
(3) That the radar mechanism was properly functioning. 
( 4) That the defendant was the driver of a car which was shown by the 
radar speed meter to be traveling at a rate of speed made unlawful by 
statute. 
(5) That the radio communication between the officers took place im-
mediately after the recorded violation, and that the alleged violator's 
license number was given to the arresting officer, or that the observing 
officer himself effected the arrest. 
It is highly arguable that (1), (2), and (5) above relate only to the 
right of the officer to arrest, and are no part of the prosecution's prima 
facie case. Note that the code does not state that if the conditions stated 
above are not met the evidence is inadmissible or that no conviction can 
be had. There is a vast difference between an illegal arrest for a crime, 
and absolute immunity from prosecution for the crime. 
With respect to the erection of the signs, it frequently would be the 
case that the officers would not have firsthand knowledge of this matter. 
To remedy this situation, it has been suggested that the State Highway 
Commissioner prepare an official table or map sho•ving the location of all 
such signs and send duly certified copies to all commonwealth attorneys. 
This would obviously facilitate matters. 
~ It is also plain that a statute making proof of certain facts prima facie 
evidence of a criminal offense does not affect the ultimate burden of 
proof. 
SUMMARY 
The decision of a case involving a speed law violation in Virginia based 
on radar evidence alone raises the follo•ving issues: 
(1) Must expert evidence be introduced to establish the reliability of 
radar equipment? 
(2) If the answer is "no," because of the wording of the statute, will 
the answer be the same in cities or towns using radar? 
(3) Will it be necessary to show that signs have been properly posted, 
that the arresting officer was in uniform or displayed his badge, and that 
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when the officers work in pairs, one had immediately communicated to 
the other the facts constituting the alleged violation? 
(4) Must the officers be examined as to what tests they have made for 
accuracy of radar devices, and, if so, would such testimony violate the 
hearsay rule where the officers communicate by radio while making trial 
runs? 
(5) If the case is tried before a judge who has already witnessed a 
demonstration, is he disqualified for having in effect taken "an unau-
thorized view"? 
The Virginia statute on the use of radar for traffic control is very clear 
and should provide the answers to most of these issues. All signs indicate 
that radar is here to stay26 and that its use will greatly reduce the number 
of traffic accidents on Virginia's highways. 
26. Radar, of course, has been in the courts in other ways than these discussed 
above, especially in connection with conning. For a discussion of the problems 
that have arisen in that field see Biesemeier and Bergs, Some Legal Aspects of Radar 
Conning, JAG J. 3(Dec. 1953). 
